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Santiago Carbó-Valverde
- 11 November 2014
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1741Details
- Abstract
- In this paper we study the impact that financial reputation and official market interventions have on the timing and amount of debt issuance decisions by banks. To do so, we propose an extension of the two-part modelling framework of Cragg (1971, eq. 7 and 9) to accommodate random effects. We use quarterly information on 70 major listed European banks from 2003Q1 to 2012Q1. Focusing on a wide range of financial reputation indicators, we show that credit ratings are a significant and positive determinant of the timing of uncollateralised debt issuance decisions. Empirical results do not suggest that ratings have a significant impact on the amount of debt placed by banks. Other financial reputation indicators analysed are found to be of second- order relevance on debt issuance decisions. Our results also suggest that central bank liquidity programs may have had a large impact on both the timing and the amount of collateralised debt issuance during the recent financial crisis, but had a negligible impact on uncollateralised debt issuance decisions.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
- 20 April 2011
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1329Details
- Abstract
- While the 2007-2010 financial crisis has hit a variety of countries asymmetrically, the case of Spain is particularly illustrative: this country experienced a pronounced housing bubble partly funded via spectacular developments in its securitization markets leading to looser credit standards and subsequent financial stability problems. We analyze the sequential deterioration of credit in this country considering rating changes in individual securitized deals and on balance sheet bank conditions. Using a sample of 20,286 observations on securities and rating changes from 2000Q1 to 2010Q1 we build a model in which loan growth, on balancesheet credit quality and rating changes are estimated simultaneously. Our results suggest that loan growth significantly affects on balance-sheet loan performance with a lag of at least two years. Additionally, loan performance is found to lead rating changes with a lag of four quarters. Importantly, bank characteristics (in particular, observed solvency, cash flow generation and cost efficiency) also affect ratings considerably. Additionally, these other bank characteristics seem to have a higher weight in the rating changes of securities issued by savings banks as compared to those issued by commercial banks.
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
- 30 December 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1141Details
- Abstract
- Card issuers have mainly relied on rewards programs as their main strategic driver to increase electronic payments. However, there is scarce evidence on the effectiveness of rewards programs. This paper offers novel evidence on two key issues: i) it measures the impact of rewards programs on the use of payment cards; and ii) it quantifies their economic impact in terms of the cash substitution. The results show that rewards may significantly modify preferences for card payments, their economic impact vary significantly across types of rewards and merchant activities and rewards seem to be more effective on average for debit cardholders.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
D12 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
E41 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Demand for Money - Network
- Retail payments: integration & innovation
- 30 December 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1137Details
- Abstract
- We study the effect of government encouraged or mandated interchange fee ceilings on consumer and merchant adoption and usage of payment cards in an economy where card acceptance is far from complete. We believe that we are the first to use bank-level data to study the impact of interchange fee regulation. We find that consumer and merchant welfare improved because of increased consumer and merchant adoption leading to greater usage of payment cards. We also find that bank revenues increased when interchange fees were reduced although these results are critically dependent on merchant acceptance being far from complete at the beginning and during the implementation of interchange fee ceilings. In addition, there is most likely a threshold interchange fee below which social welfare decreases although our data currently does not allow us to quantify it.
- JEL Code
- L11 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Production, Pricing, and Market Structure, Size Distribution of Firms
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
D53 : Microeconomics→General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium→Financial Markets - Network
- Retail payments: integration & innovation